Market 
              Extremists Amok and How Best to Dethrone Them 
            By Kevin Phillips Issue 
              Date: 7.15.02 
              http://www.prospect.org 
            Market extremism 
              doesn't wear hoods, white sheets, or armbands. Skinheads in its 
              ranks are few. Suicide bombers in its cause are even fewer. 
            But the essence 
              of extremism, as opposed to other specific "isms," is 
              to extend -- harshly, rigidly, and dangerously -- a commitment and 
              ideology that in softer and milder forms can be acceptable or useful. 
              Worship of an unfettered, self-justifying marketplace developed 
              in exactly this harsh, rigid form during the 1980s and 1990s. The 
              infamous practices of Enron, where market mania turned abusive, 
              with the help of the Bush family, are only the tip of one berg in 
              an ice field that continues to threaten national political and economic 
              navigation. 
            Over the last 
              15 years, market-based excesses have run the gamut from crony-driven 
              privatization of public assets and attempts to remold U.S. law into 
              a branch of laissez-faire economics to even bolder efforts to recast 
              U.S. election finance as a marketplace. These unchained markets 
              have reshaped the global economy around international mechanisms 
              -- such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) -- empowered to override 
              local and national laws and regulations in the name of investment 
              flow. Market mania has emerged as the both the pivotal crippler 
              of U.S. democracy and the driving force behind the upward redistribution 
              of U.S. wealth. It has made the egalitarian principles and patterns 
              of the 1950s and 1960s vanish in a cloud of dust. 
            On the other 
              hand, this market zeitgeist has its own history of vulnerability. 
              If the Democratic Party and liberalism have a history of doing themselves 
              in through naive international policies and cultural excursions 
              that lacked majority support -- causes from Southern slaveholding 
              in the mid-nineteenth century to agrarian insurgencies in the 1890s 
              and urban and campus radicalism in the 1960s and early 1970s -- 
              the self-destructive face of Republicanism and conservatism has 
              involved markets, corporations, and fealty to the rich. These penchants 
              characterized the Gilded Age of the late nineteenth century, the 
              Roaring Twenties, and the last two decades. 
            Edward Chancellor, 
              in Devil Take the Hindmost: A History of Financial Speculation, 
              notes that the first bourse in Amsterdam was a place where gentlemen 
              refused to go, sending agents instead. Gambling analogies pervaded 
              the early financial markets (and still plague current ones). The 
              famous eighteenth-century financier John Law doubled as an expert 
              at the game of hazard. The term "blue chip" used in the 
              stock market came from the highest denomination chip in the Monte 
              Carlo casino. 
            One can only 
              wonder at the gall of the American and British think tanks and pundits 
              who have held out "markets" as an alternative organizational 
              basis for society (to replace the notions of state, polity, and 
              community developed over 2,000 years). The self-interest of their 
              corporate and upper-bracket patrons, of course, is more obvious. 
            Still, the cautions 
              befitting the market's dubious background were pushed aside in the 
              1980s, as a curious mix of zealots and self-servers decided to exalt 
              markets in general -- and the financial markets in particular -- 
              into the premier institutions of American governance. 
            Seriousness 
              was abandoned, just as it had been a century earlier when kindred 
              U.S. business and financial apologists latched onto the social Darwinist 
              theories of an Englishman, Herbert Spencer, in order to justify 
              the dog-eat-dog economics at work in the United States. The Gilded 
              Age economy, said William Graham Sumner of Yale, simply exemplified 
              the "survival of the fittest" that Charles Darwin had 
              found in biology. U.S. Senator Chauncey Depew prattled to New York 
              millionaire audiences about their being the chosen ones of a grand 
              evolutionary process. 
            A century later, 
              it wasn't social Darwinism but rather market-centric perspectives 
              that were invoked to explain a wide range of phenomena. The public-choice 
              school of thought framed politics itself as a counterproductive 
              snarl of interest-group competitions and urged an alternative ideology 
              that emphasized market principles. 
            In such crusades, 
              markets were never discussed factually as arenas in which money 
              prevailed – arenas therefore innately favorable to wealth 
              concentration and to the interests of the rich. Instead, they were 
              dressed up in more appealing clothes as the truest vehicles of democracy. 
            In retrospect, 
              it all quacks like the duck in the AFLAC commercial. The marketplace, 
              in this fantasy, became the ultimate forum where the people could 
              express themselves, where they could do battle with Harvard- type 
              elitists who didn't want them to spend their money on large automobiles. 
              The sages of The Wall Street Journal editorial page told readers 
              in the mid-1990s that voters wanted to be treated as customers, 
              not constituents. 
            Former Citicorp 
              Chairman Walter Wriston, famous for almost wrecking his bank with 
              earlier unwise loans to Latin America, opined in 1992 that "markets 
              are voting machines; they function by taking referenda." The 
              proletariat, predicted Wriston, would eventually "fight to 
              reduce government power over the corporations for which they work, 
              organizations far more democratic, collegial, and tolerant than 
              distant state bureaucracies." Parallel balderdash issued from 
              Newt Gingrich during his brief mid-1990s reign as House speaker. 
              He dreamed about the possibility of establishing a "consumer-directed 
              government," once suggesting that critical social problems 
              could be resolved simply by asking "our major multinational 
              corporations for advice." 
            All of this 
              hot air about a new era -- at least partially based in the perfectibility 
              of markets -- helped launch the four-year speculative bubble that 
              finally burst in 2000 2002. But kindred thinking also helped blueprint 
              other dubious market-manic constructions that still stand. For a 
              short list, consider these: excessive deregulation of finance and 
              energy, privatization of public assets, privatization of Social 
              Security, and the use of transnational organizations such as the 
              WTO and NAFTA to override local and national laws, in the United 
              States and elsewhere, that interfere with market absolutism. These 
              may become some of the great battlegrounds of the early twenty-first-century 
              economy. Another could take shape around attempts to justify globalization 
              as a market-driven inevitability. 
            No serious opposition 
              politics can emerge that does not challenge at least the extremes 
              of this faith in markets, but no faith could be riper for the picking. 
              Its conceptual underpinnings were questionable enough, though they 
              did not get enough questioning, six or eight years ago. Since then, 
              the NASDAQ crash and the Enron, Arthur Andersen, and Merrill Lynch 
              scandals have told the average American enough about the fallibility 
              of business, finance, and markets to make the new- economy truisms 
              of five years ago sound like the premises of cranks. 
            Extreme politics, 
              in this new form as in others before it, has a distinct regional 
              home. As much as the ideological excesses of the left in the 1960s 
              evoked Berkeley, and the militia groups on the right were a Rocky 
              Mountain phenomenon, the market mania of the last two decades has 
              centered on Texas -- economic Lone Ranger country, where market 
              fundamentalism and religious fundamentalism have joined to create 
              a uniquely strident culture. In Texas, government doesn't get in 
              the way of "bidness." Pollution flourishes, there's no 
              income tax, and the state's biggest city, Houston, won't tolerate 
              zoning. In Texas, the business and academic infrastructure lists 
              well to the right of that in any other major state. The Federal 
              Reserve Bank of Dallas is the most conservative and market- propagandistic 
              of the 12 regional Federal Reserve banks. Think tanks connected 
              with the Texas GOP congressional delegation can be counted on for 
              economic tracts that make Southern Baptist Convention resolutions 
              look subtle and avant-garde. 
            Twenty years 
              ago, a still-Connecticut-tinged George Bush Senior made his famous 
              remark about supply-side tax cuts being "voodoo economics," 
              but he learned fast. By 1985, when Texas-based Enron was formed, 
              Vice President Bush was already captaining the Reagan administration's 
              Task Force on Regulatory Relief, and his four-year term as president 
              would produce two pieces of market-worshipping policy that proved 
              vital to the company's future operations. These were the 1992 energy 
              act, which obliged utility companies to transmit electricity shipped 
              by Enron and other marketers, and a regulation issued by the Commodity 
              Futures Trading Commission, which created a legal exemption that 
              let Enron begin trading energy derivatives. 
            Enron was en 
              route to its millennial climax: speculating, trading, and manipulating 
              energy costs in deregulated markets. And the Bush family and retainers 
              clustered around it like bees around the honeycomb. 
            This collusion 
              was not without reward, but it also left Bush pere et fils, and 
              market mania, open to attack. It isn't often that a major issue 
              in U.S. politics -- perhaps even a potential watershed issue -- 
              comes with such a juicy related scandal. Not long ago, this vulnerability 
              of Texas royalty and Texas philosophy would have been hard to imagine. 
              Now, market extremism is in the dock of public opinion. The question 
              is not whether a coherent and powerful indictment can take form, 
              but whether the Democratic opposition in Washington is capable of 
              shaping and voicing it. 
            Kevin Phillips 
            Copyright 
              (c) 2002 by The American Prospect, Inc. 
              Preferred Citation: Kevin Phillips, "Market Extremists Amok," 
              The American Prospect vol. 13 no. 13, July 15, 2002 . This article 
              may not be resold, reprinted, or redistributed for compensation 
              of any kind without prior written permission from the author.  
             
                
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