The Powell Doctrine developed with Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberg under President Ronald Reagan was a reaction to the US defeat in Viet-Nam. This strategy calls for overwhelming initial military force, political support at home, international agreement abroad and a clear exit plan. None of this was achieved in the Iraq War. In terms of military organization the force size became a hotly debated point. It was openly known that Rumsfeld rejected General Frank’s plan for up to 300,000 troops to enter Iraq. This was in-line with the overwhelming force doctrine but contradicted Rumsfeld’s desire to use the invasion to push the changes he believed necessary. During the first ten days of the war as the long US supply lines were subjected to guerrilla attacks criticism quickly surfaced that not enough troops had been sent. With the rapid fall of Baghdad the debate swung towards Rumsfeld, but unable to control post-war security the debate has continued and became more bitter. Another important aspect of the debate is the need for international support to provide troops to relieve US forces. This cuts against the unilateral hubris of Rumsfeld even as tours of duty are extended and the retirement of 30,000 troops halted forcing an extension of their service because of the shortage of soldiers.

The state of the US military today leaves both Powell and Rumsfeld in difficult positions. In a report by Minqi Li he states: “Out of the US Army’s thirty-three brigades, sixteen are now in Iraq, two are in Afghanistan, two are in South Korea, and one is in Kosovo. Of the twelve brigades in the United States, three are in modernization training, three are in reserve for possible war in Korea, and two are going to relieve the troops in Afghanistan. There are only four brigades left to relieve the sixteen brigades in Iraq. In effect, the United States has exhausted its entire regular army just to occupy such totally impoverished third world countries as Afghanistan and Iraq.” (3) It seems Powell’s overwhelming force doctrine is good for only one war at a time while Rumsfeld’s smaller military is too small for the task on hand.

Lastly we need to consider the band of neoconservative cadre that is most responsible for the hegemonic direction of US international strategy. The neoconservatives have their own particular history coming out of certain academic circles and the right wing of the Democratic Party during the Viet-Nam War. They coalesced in a number of think tanks and journals with strong links to the Likud Party in Israel and began to occupy influential posts in the Reagan administration. Although the realists obtained the senior positions in the Bush White House, neoconservatives were given the number two and three spots in important areas. Among the most influential are Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense; Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; John Bolton, Under Secretary of State; Lewis Libby, Chief of Staff for the Vice President; Elliot Abrams, Special Assistant to the President; and Richard Perle, ex-chair of the Defense Policy Board.

Neoconservatives saw the fall of the Soviet Union as a golden opportunity to assert US hegemony. This was conceived as a unilateral project that would extend over the next century, allowing no rivals to gather the strength to challenge US domination. Similar to the realists, neoconservatives see a Hobbsian world of chaos and competition. But unlike the realists who are driven primarily by security concerns, the neoconservatives attach greater importance to ideas and values. It was their emphasis on ideology that allowed them to produce the most clearly stated and strongly argued position for US preeminence. For neoconservatives the US must assume the task of promoting free market capitalism, Judeo-Christian ethics and the culture and politics of Western civilization. This can be done best under US tutelage not globalist guidance which is tainted with European socialism and weak moral values. To the neoconservatives globalism at best is a fantasy in a world beset by dictators and weapons of mass destruction, at worst it’s a surrender of US interests and a betrayal of American cultural values. For US unilateralists only America has the will and strength to maintain security, acting as the thin blue line in a world ghetto filled with barbarians.

As part of this project the US should assume the task of nation building, not unlike Rudyard Kipling’s “white man’s burden” propagated during the British Empire. It is from this viewpoint that we hear the discourse about bringing democracy to the Middle East and Iraq. As Wolfowitz once commented, “Nothing could be less realistic than the version of the realist view of foreign policy that dismisses human rights as an important tool of American foreign policy.” (4) But for neoconservatives democracy is synonymous with free markets and neo-liberal economics, so the privatization of statist Middle East oil and energy interests define their nation building vision while direct elections are debated as an expedient tactical question.

It’s this attention to ideology and nation building that separates the neoconservatives from the realists of both the Rumsfeld and Powell camps. Realists believe in pursuing US vital interests. Their disagreement with Clinton was that Kosovo, Somali and Haiti were not vital interests and a waste of time, money and resources. Nation building was criticized as globalists over extension. The job in both Afghanistan and Iraq is simply to make them secure and guard against their use as terrorists base camps or threats to US interests. Both neoconservatives and realists agree that oil is vital to US interests. But setting up governments, opening schools, building highways and providing jobs are all secondary concerns to the realists. As Dr. Rice stated, “The president must remember that the military is a special instrument. It is lethal and it is meant to be. It is not a civilian police force. It is not a political referee. And it is most certainly not designed to build a civilian society.” (5)

Given the realist rejection of nation building it’s no small wonder that they find the task so difficult in Iraq and Afghanistan. Their failure to plan for post-war Iraq is directly related to their political rejection of globalist nation building. Neoconservatives may have advocated more attention but their disdain for the UN, the one institution with the most experience in civil restoration, undercut their ability to devise a reasonable plan of action. Blinded by their cultural arrogance and their political ignorance of Iraqi realities they believed their own propaganda that US troops would be received by flowers, kisses and oil contract. Both camps are now caught in a situation neither was prepared for. As the US occupation deteriorates they lurch back and forth in their dogmas unable to devise a plan to stabilize Iraq and unable to declare a clear victory. As the goal of world hegemony sinks into the desert sands US imperialism once again appears as a paper tiger. As in Viet Nam the human toll is tremendous but global dominance has become impossible.

1. Yardley, Jonathan. “The Ruling Class, a family saga of secrecy, oil money and privilege.” Washington Post. (January 11, 2004) p. TO1.

2. Kilpartrick, Jeanne. “American Power – for what?” Commentary (January 2000)

3. Li, Minqi. “After Neoliberalism, Empire, Social Democracy, or Socialism?” Monthly Review (January 2004) pp. 21 – 36.

4. Desch, Michael. “Liberals, neocons, and realcons.” Orbis, V. 45, No. 4. (Fall) p. 25.

5. Harding, James. “Comments and Analysis: Weakness in the White House.” Financial Times, (Sept. 15, 2003) p. 13.