This same trend has hit Latin America and Asia. In Hong Kong the Internet access company Pacific Century Cyber Works was recently acquired for $38 billion by Cable and Wireless HKT, Hong Kong’s dominant phone company. Meanwhile Spain’s recently privatized Telefonica SA has bought telecommunication and Internet companies throughout South America, including the biggest markets in Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. The top ten telecommunications firms now control 86% of the world market. (31)

Japanese corporations have also entered into alliances and made important acquisitions. Matsushita Electric entered Europe with three major Internet deals, while Nippon Telegraph and Telephone made a $5 billion deal for Colorado based Verio, the largest U.S. operator of business web sites. (32) In a huge move Japan’s largest Internet group, Softbank, plans to become Europe’s biggest Internet investor by establishing two funds with a combined worth of $1 billion. One fund devoted to the UK is worth $450 million and is in alliance with News Corporation, which invested $150 million. The other fund worth $550 million is partnered with Vivendinet in France. (33)

Softbank has already invested in 300 Internet companies around the globe but the fit in Europe is particularly good. Both Europe and Japan are exploding in Internet wireless connections. In Japan DoCoMo, a subsidiary of Nippon T&T, has bypassed computers to spawn an e-mail craze with wireless phones. With six million subscribers and about 25,000 people signing up daily DoCoMo’s market value tripled in 15 months to $370 billion. (34) In Europe free Internet connections via wireless phones is also widespread and is soon expected to overtake PC users. Says Eric Hippeau, president of Softbank International Ventures, “We’re particularly interested in wireless technology because Europe seems to be ahead of the US in this field. We can introduce technologies from Europe to the rest of the world.” (35) DoCoMo has now allied with Hong Kong conglomerate Hutchinson Whampoa and the Dutch mobile phone operator Royal KPN to buy-up the license rights for the next generation of mobile communication services in Britain, Germany, France and Belgium.

Not to be left behind Microsoft has jumped into the Asian market hoping to become the dominant power in broadband. Microsoft wants to put Windows into TV set-top boxes and mobile phones in a region where broadband is more widespread than the US. Gates has allied with Legend and Haier in China to develop television set-top boxes, and with DoCoMo in Japan. In Taiwan, Microsoft is working with Gigamedia of the Koos Group to bring Internet services to TV, mobile phones, and PCs. In Europe they have joined with Palm’s biggest competitor, UK’s Psion, and Sweden’s Ericsson, major players in the mobile phone market. (36)

A good illustration of the fierce competition among transnationals was the most expensive buy-out in history ($185 billion) that took place in Europe when Britain’s Vodafone/Airtouch took over Germany’s Mannesmann. The acquistion created the largest wireless telephone corporation in the world. Not only will the new company control the biggest Euro markets in Britain, Germany and Italy, it will have holdings in more than 30 countries including the U.S. and Japan. Europe shares a common wireless transmission standard, so mobile phone use is much more widespread than in the U.S. The Vodafone/Mannesmann merger also has huge implications for Internet users, because throughout Europe personal computer access to the net is limited and expensive. In achieving a monopoly over wireless communication Vodafone is now in the position to be the largest Internet portal in Europe.

The takeover of Mannesmann was a protracted battle in which both corporations tried to gain advantage by moving directly into the other’s market. In January ’99 Vodaphone acquired Airtouch in the U.S., an important minority partner of Mannesmann. Mannesmann fought back by entering the British market when it bought out the large mobil phone network Orange for $33 billion in October ’99. When Vodafone stoled away another Mannesmann partner, this time in an Internet deal with Vivendi in France, they had finally maneuvered into a dominant competitive position.

Although both corporations had strong domestic identities their respective governments steered clear of being drawn into a nationalist brawl. Even as Mannesmann was threatened by a hostile foreign takeover, Chancellor Gerhard Schroder judged government interference could jeopardize future mergers in which German corporations would continue their global integration. The acquisition of Chrysler by Damiler Benz has marked the true road forward for German transnationals.

To think of the English, Germans, or any national group as winners in these mergers is to miss their essential character as transnational deals engineered by de-nationalized elites. Global markets are transforming national capitalists into a transnational class with common goals and interests. Mannesmann’s CEO, Klau Esser, a member of the new global class declined to use nationalist political rhetoric as a strategy to defend his corporation. Tens of thousands union workers protested the proposed merger, as did most German investors. Yet Esser ignored his domestic audience and appealed to his global shareholders to hold out for a higher share price. When Vodafone upped their offer the majority of shareholders bought the deal. Esser understood that the question over which partner would dominate the deal was a secondary consideration to building a new transnational giant and allowed the process to unfold.

Mannessmann may have had a German face, but in reality it was already a thoroughly transnationalized corporation with many institutional investors in the U.S. and Britain. Mannesmann also had important global holdings such as Italy’s second-largest phone company Infostrade, and major U.S. interests in phone, publishing, and music. If you swoon to Whitney Houston or groove to Santana you’ve been listening to a Mannesmann CD.

After Vodafone’s acquistion of Mannessmann, Orange was unloaded to France’s Telecom for $37 billion. This adds six million customers to Telecom, which also has operations in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. (37)

The Vodafone/Mannessmann merger illustrates the elevation of international stock prices over domestic concerns and underscores how national markets and politics are becoming secondary factors in a globalized economy. In fact, about 40% of all stocks traded in Frankfurt on the DAX are held by foreigners. The newly merged Vodafone now joins a rapidly growing group that includes BP and Amoco; Credit Suisse and First Boston; Bertelsmann and Random House and many others. These are corporations whose national identities fade away as they shape the world economy and compete under the new rules of globalization.

IT And New Private Wealth

As IT production expanded it developed into powerful new corporations, creating a new stock market, new wealth, and new capitalists. This new bourgeoisie is a key group within the rising transnational capitalist class and is developing its own characteristics and at times its own politics. Recently Money and Business conducted an analysis of chief executive’s pay comparing 100 of America’s largest non-technology companies to 60 of the leading new economy Nasdaq corporations. The average pay of old economy chief executives was $7.1 million, compared to $27.5 million for the new economy leaders. The info-tech executives on average have also accumulated $720 million more in equity, almost ten times the holdings of old economy bosses. (38) This wealth is based in the market valuation of stocks that are used much more widely by the new economy corporations as part of executive compensation. This is also true in Europe, where info-tech corporations on the hunt for top talent have begun the same practices as U.S. corporations. While this wealth will fluctuate with the market, it’s an innovative use of tying the best talent into ownership.

This has not only made Bill Gates the richest man in the world with $71 billion in wealth, but created 10 other chief executives with ownership stakes over a billion dollars among the top 60 info-tech firms. Even after the post Spring 2000 Nasdaq crash these executives were worth a billion or more: Jeffrey Bezos of Amazon, $8.9 billion; Lawrence Ellison of Oracle, $8.4 billion; Henry Nicholos III of Broadcom, a producer of communication chips, $4.8 billion; Timothy Koogle of Yahoo, $2.4 billion; Jo Mei Chang of Vitria Technology, a maker of e-commerce software, $2.3 billion; David Wetherall of CMGI, $1.8 billion; Stephen Case of AOL, $ 1.7 billion; Irwin Jacobs at QualComm, $1.2 billion; and Scott Kriens of Juniper Networks, a maker of Internet routers, $1.1 billion. (39)

Among the 100 top DOW chief executives only two had ownership stakes over a billion: Patrick Ryan of Aon with $1.2 billion and Frederick Smith at Fed Ex with $1.1 billion. (40)

These figures report on chief executives, but the Forbes 400 lists the greatest personal fortunes in the United States. As Forbes points out: “Heavy industrial fortunes would have dominated our list decades ago.” (41) But no longer, information technology capitalists are this era’s stars. To appear on the list you need a minimum of $625 million. Overall about two-thirds are billionaires. Of the five richest men three come from Microsoft and one from Dell. Of the total 400, 89 have wealth tied to the IT sector. IT capitalists also tend to be younger, 48 being under 50 years old. Of the Forbes 400 only a total of 77 fit that age category. (42)

Of the 350,000 wealthiest households in America (worth $10 million or more), 5% are headed by someone 35 years old or younger. That’s 17,500 households, most of who represent new economy wealth. In 1983 only 0.79% of the richest households were headed by someone 35 or younger. (43)

Over the past decade there has been an outburst of magazines dedicated to watching and promoting the IT sector. Wired is perhaps the most widely read dedicating 400 pages every month to trumpet the successes of the new economy. In June they print their own annual index of 40 IT companies that are “driving the future” complete with CEO profiles and investment advice. Computer Resellers News is even more self-conscious focusing on individual leaders of the IT super-rich. Every November they choose 25 top IT corporate leaders complete with personal profiles and a parallel reader’s poll. They also have established an “Industry Hall of Fame” with annual inductees. There are currently 37 members and you can go online to read articles, see photographs and video clips and hear recorded interviews on each member of this IT Valhalla. The magazine also sponsors an inductee gala event, which in 1999 took place in the Hard Rock Hotel in Las Vegas with 1,000 in attendance. These magazines and events illustrate that IT capitalists are fully self-aware and see themselves as a separate sector within their class.

The development of the IT grouping has interesting historic parallels to the rise of the industrial bourgeoisie in Great Britain. The industrial technology revolution that began in England around 1760 produced a whole host of new industries, new means of production and new wealth that brought about capitalism’s modern era. The industrial revolution created value much more rapidly than the old agricultural economy, and the wealth and political influence of the new rich soon outstripped that of the old money. But the industrial bourgeoisie also merged with the landed gentry through common investments, financial mergers, and marriage. Also land management modernized to produce the first factory farms, transforming feudal estates with new farming equipment and methods of production. In this manner important sectors of the old agricultural economy became part of industrial capitalism.

The same process can be seen today as old industrial families invest in new technology, and industrial corporations adopt information technologies to transform themselves and step into the new economy. As the New York Times notes, “From Taiwan to Thailand, the region’s most powerful families have started a blizzard of online ventures. Whether their core businesses are in property, telecommunications or banking, Asia’s tycoons are seizing on the Internet in hopes of expanding their reach.” (44) This strategy is not isolated to Asian capitalism, but is a global trend.

Even in China the IT sector is at the core of a newly developing non-statist capitalist class. The amount of foreign money flowing to private entrepreneurs is without precedent since the 1949 revolution. Already three of China’s dot coms are listed on the Nasdaq. As the New York Times observes, “as China’s old Marxists know, capital is power and if the country’s young Internet entrepreneurs can hang onto their assets and make them grow, they could emerge as a potent force shaping the country’s economic – and political – future.” (45)

The IT Political Agenda

Competition can be fierce within the IT stratum as the government’s anti-monopoly suit against Microsoft revealed. But there are also commonly shared political, social and economic goals. Some of these are a no tax policy for e-commerce; support for government social spending to expand the use of computers and internet access; an open immigration policy for IT professionals; support for regulatory legislation that has allowed the merger of telephony, television and computer technology; limiting lawsuits from Year 2000 computer failures; ending overtime pay after an eight-hour workday; enforcing US copyright laws to protect intellectual capital; and support for China’s entry into the WTO.

The political involvement of info-tech capitalists is growing rapidly in the nation’s capital. Microsoft has spent about $16 million in donations to candidates and lobbying efforts since the government’s antitrust suit in 1997. Other Internet companies have more than doubled their political contributions in 1999 to $4.5 million, while telecommunications and phone companies added another $7.61 million. As with many industries this money is more or less evenly split between both parties. Info-tech corporations have dramatically increased their lobbying efforts in Washington, and politicians are falling over each other to help pro-industry legislation through Congress. Often bills favored by high-tech corporations get support from a mix of New Democrats and Republicans. “ ‘You have to work hard to make technology issues Democrat or Republican, liberal or conservative,’ said Representative Edward J. Markey, Democrat of Massachusetts. ‘ It’s not the contras versus the Sandinistas’.” (46)

New Democrats meet with Silicon Valley executives regularly. Says Wade Randlett co-founder of TechNet and executive at Red Gorilla “I think they are trying to create a mini high-tech party in a way. It’s a smart political approach.” (47) Republican Representative of Louisiana, W.J. Tauzin calls the info-tech executives “stars,” while Virginia Democratic Representative James Moran notes “People want to know them, touch them.” (48) As the info-tech industry grows its political wish list becomes larger and hundreds of bills that effect the industry are now in Congress. Says Democratic leader Senator Tom Daschle, “The level of interest is as high or higher than any other set of issues I’m aware of. It’s a new paradigm.” (49)

The IT industry has also sought to taylor social policies by establishing large grant foundations. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is now the largest private foundation with an endowment of $17 billion, followed by the Lilly Endowment at $15 billion. Hewlett-Packard recently nudged aside the Ford Foundation for the third spot with an endowment of $10 billion. (50)

IT And Industrial Capital

The drive towards a world capitalist system is rooted in its competitive struggle for accumulation. But the mode by which the nationally based industrial sector is transformed into transnational corporations is defined by IT. Its’ not just a change in the way competition unfolds or where capital is invested, but the way in which information technology has changed industrial technology. This has a direct impact on how globalization is structured, its capabilities and mode of operation. Abby Joseph Cohen, chief strategist at Goldman Sachs notes; “In many ways it’s artificial to draw a distinction between the so-called old economy and new economy, because the real magic of the U.S. economy has been the enormous application of technology.” (51) Adds Fortune, “the companies of the 500 that get the NET – even if they’re smokestack industries – are way ahead of their less Netsavvy rivals.” (52)

One effect of IT is shifts in the make-up of the labor force, with layoffs and hiring at the same time in the same company. The Tribune reports “In a recent survey, the American management Association found that 36% of approximately 2,000 companies contacted created new jobs at the same time that they cut existing jobs.” (53) For example, AT&T is eliminating accountants, marketing managers, telephone operators and repair people, but adding jobs in software developers, Internet specialists, and sales agents. Although many of the newer jobs have higher salaries, AT&T plans to layoff 40,000 workers while only adding 10,000. These shifts in the labor force help explain the current nature of class divisions and the growing divide in incomes.

Auto is perhaps the best example of the marriage of the old and new economies. It is the auto that best represents the industrial economy in the twentieth century. Its development pushed the expansion of the rubber, steel, glass and oil industries, it caused the development of our highway system, changed the urban landscape into limitless suburbs, helped build a national economy, and impacted our culture in many faceted ways. Yet today this old industry is thoroughly linked to the tools and organization of the new economy much in the manner that feudal farming was transformed by the industrial revolution.

This transformation has taken place in every phase of auto manufacturing and can be divided into five categories: organization; research and design; means of production; product; and marketing and supplies.

Organization: The global assembly line constructed by the auto industry was made possible by the new command and control system built by information technology. The coordination of production, the transnational flow of parts, the sharing and speed of data, accounting and finances are all done through the instant connectivity of computer networks and software that organizes and channels the necessary information. This level of coordination and the speed needed to operate the system would be physically impossible with the simple phone lines of the 1950s and 60s. GM, Ford and Daimler-Chrysler now plan to create a business to business web site that would coordinate transactions for everything automakers and their suppliers buy. This global parts exchange would handle about $750 billion in e-commerce transactions. This would also speed engineering changes because innovations would be sent instantaneously up and down the line resulting in a smoother coordination of supplies and products.

Research and Design: All modeling is done with computers and software created for this specific work. The research for developing new parts, the use of new materials, as well as the design of each model is accomplished with information technologies. Beyond the manner in which vehicles are designed have been the engineering efforts to integrate microprocessors into the operation of cars and trucks. Also the coordination of these projects and their global work teams operate through real time connections carried out via the integration of computer and telecommunications.

Means of Production: Robot painters, wielders and assemblers are the most obvious changes in the means of production, but the changes are deeper and more imbedded. Many tools like lathes, drill presses and milling machines are run by numerical control technology. Also the coordination of work and its pace inside the factory is carried out through the use of IT. These changes have lead to huge productivity gains in the auto industry and a drop in employment. At the Ford factory in Chihuahua, Mexico, 16 workers produce 1,200 cylinder blocks per shifts. (54) Recently Chrysler built a plant with an operating plan of only five-years, based on the expected life span of the software that manages production. Since IT is now seen as the source of added value the factory is organized on its lifecycle, not industrial assets such as heavy machinery. (55)

Product: Cars are imbedded with microprocessors at virtual every level of function. The engine, the flow of gas, traction control, diagnostics and entertainment systems all run on software and microprocessors. The Economist reports that, “The typical car today has more computer-processing power than the first lunar landing-craft had in 1969.” (56)

Marketing: Every medium that advertises and markets cars has been changed by the technological revolution. The message of ads may not have changed, but the technology that delivers it has. E-commerce and web site marketing are changing the way vehicles are sold. The ultimate hope of the auto industry is to link customers to the car before it leaves the assembly line via Internet ordering. Although the build-to-order system is not in the near future it remains a major goal and one that would eliminate car dealerships.

These multiple changes have created the global assembly line that in turn has produced growing centralization in the auto industry. As competition became more global and less national it spawned a spectacular rise in world mergers. In auto there are now five transnational players who own or control 20 formerly independent manufactures.

The General Motors’ empire includes: Fiat, Subaru, Isuzu, Saab, and Suzuki. Ford controls Jaguar, Aston Martin, Land Rover, Mazda, and Volvo. Volkswagon has acquired Audi, Bently, Birgatti, Lamborghini, Seat and Skoda. The three other major world corporations are Damiler Benz which own Chrysler and have major stock in Mitsubishi. Renault, which controls Nissan and acquired Samsung, and Toyota, which recently took over Daihatsu. Furthermore Daewoo is expected to be bought in the near future by either G.M or Ford. This leaves only Honda, BMW, and Hyundai as important independents. (57)

What is true for the auto industry also applies to other major industrial groups. Not only does ownership cross borders, but production, design, supplies and marketing are also global. This whole system is run and made possible by IT. The old industrial economy is thoroughly saturated at every level with the new means of production. Says Thomas Kwok of the Hong Kong business empire Sun Hung Kai, “One good thing about old-economy companies is that they have profits and cash flow, but old-economy companies need new-economy ideas to survive.” (58) That’s what makes info-tech capitalism so key to the creation of a global economy and the transnational capitalist class. The fabulous wealth of the new economy goes far deeper than dot com stock speculation. In actuality the dot com craze is only an outward manifestation of a much more firmly rooted creation of new value.

1. For an analysis of the formation of the transnational capitalist class see Bill Robinson and Jerry Harris, ‘Towards a Global Ruling Class: Globalization and the Transnational Capitalist Class’, Science and Society, (Spring 2000)

2. Manuel Castells has written extensively on the “network society” and impact of the information age, while Paul Romer had developed the “New Growth Theory” that explores the importance of ideas to the development of an economy.

3. James Fallows, ‘Billion Dollar Babies’, The New York Review, (16-December 1999), p. 9.

4. ‘The Fortune Global Five Hundred, the World’s Largest Corporations’, Fortune, (2 August 1999).

5. In analyzing the electronics industry I included in the chart only those corporations with substantial investments in IT products. For example, Fortune lists both Whirlpool and Intel in the same category. Out of 25 on Fortune’s list I choose the following 16: Siemens; Hitachi; Matsushita; Toshiba; Royal Philips; NEC; Lucent Technologies; Motorola; Intel; L.M. Ericsson; Samsung; Northern Telecom; Sanyo; Nokia; Sharp; and Tyco International;

6. I included Rubber because it listed only three corporations, Bridgestone, Michelin, and Goodyear, all tightly linked to the transportation industry through tire production. ‘The Fortune 500’, Fortune, (17 April 2000).

7. In listing the US electronics industry I used the same method as above. Out of 31 corporations I choose the following 10: Motorola; Solectron; Rockwell Intl.; QualComm; Harris; Micron Technology; Molex; Conexant Systems; DII Group; and Sanmina.

8. Lipper, Wall Street Journal Market Data Group. ‘Best and Worst’, The Wall Street Journal, (8 May 2000)

9. Suzanne McGee, ‘Venture Capitalists Still Love Start-Ups’, The Wall Street Journal, (4 May 2000), p. C1.

10. Greg Ip and E.S. Browning, ‘NASDAQ Swings are Unprecedented But Consumers are Not Spooked’, Wall Street Journal, p. 3. (http://www. global.noc.org), (17 April 2000).

11. Lipper, Wall Street Journal Market Data Group. ‘Best and Worst’, Wall Street Journal, p. R17. (8 May 2000).

12. Mark Heinzl, ‘Above the U.S.’, Wall Street Journal, p. R 13. (8 May 2000).
    Edmund L. Andrews, ‘The Metamorphosis of Germany Inc.’, New York Times, Section 3, p. 1. (12 March 2000).

13. Beborah Ball and Vanessa Fuhrman, ‘Net Gain’, Wall Street Journal, p. R9. (8 May 2000)

14. Warburg Dillon Read, Datastream. ‘What Is Value’, Wall Street Journal, p. R9. (8 May 2000).

15. Lipper, Wall Street Journal Market Data Group. ‘The Best and Worst’, Wall Street Journal’, p. R17. (8 May 2000).

16. Bill Barnhart ‘Cross Border Marriages Will Ease Investing’, Chicago Tribune, Section 5, p. 3. (7 May 2000).

17. Morningstar Inc. ‘The Tentacles of Technology’, New York Times, p. BU 8. (2 April 2000).

18. Ibid 21. Edmund L. Andrews, ‘The Metamorphosis of Germany Inc.’, New York Times, Section 3 p. 1. (12 march 2000)

19. Gerhard Cromme, chief executive of Germany’s biggest steel company Thyssen Krupp.

20. Anthony Bright, The Electric Lamp Industry, New York, (MacMillian, 1949). P. 85.

21. Scott Thurman, ‘Cisco Agrees to Buy Arrow Point for About $6.1 Billion in Stock’, Wall Street Journal, p. A4. (8 May 2000).

22. Noshua Watson, ‘The Lists’, Fortune, p. 295. (17 April 2000).

23. Jeremy Kahn, ‘The Fortune Global Five Hundred’, Fortune, p. 144. (2 August 1999).

24. R.C. Longworth, ‘Suddenly Our Manuels are Out of Date’, Chicago Tribune, Section 2, p. 1. (9 April 2000).

25. Suzanne Koudsi, ‘Ten Deals We’d Like to See’, Fortune, p. 58. (17 April 2000).

26. Jeremy Kahn, “The Fortune Global Five Hundred’, Fortune, p. 144. (2 August 1999).

27. John Bellamy Foster, ‘Monopoly Capital At the Turn of the Millennium’, Monthly Review, p. 12. (April 2000)

28. Stephan Labaton, ‘ATT Clears Step in Bid to Purchase a Cable TV Giant’, New York Times, p. 1. (26 May 2000)

29. John Bellamy Foster, ‘Monopoly Capital At the Turn of the Millennium’, Monthly Review, p. 12. (April 2000).

30. Nikhal Deogin and Steve Lipin, ‘NTT Agrees to Buy 90% of Verio’, Wall Street Journal, p. A21. (8 February 2000)

31. Paul Abrahams, ‘Softbank in $1bn European Internet Investment Move’, Financial Times, p. 15. (3 March 2000).

32. Uli Schmetzer, ‘Wireless ‘I-Mail’ Connects Japan’, Chicago Tribune, Section 3, p. 1. (24 May 2000).

33. Paul Abrahams, ‘Softbank in $1bn European Internet Investment Move’, Financial Times, p. 15. (3 March 2000).

34. Neel Chowdhury, ‘Gates and Co. Attack Asia’, Fortune, p. 197. (17 April 2000).

35. Andrew R. Sorkin, ‘For Vodafone, Saving Grace from French’, New York Times, p. C1. (29 May 2000).

36. David Leonhardt, ‘Order of Compensation Universe Reflects Pull of New Economy’, New York Times, Section 3 p. 1. (2 April 2000).

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. ‘America’s 400 Richest People’, Forbes, p. 338. (Special Issue 1999).

40. ‘America’s 400 Richest People’, Forbes, (Special Issue 1999).

41. Laura Holson, ‘Nothing Left to Buy?’, New York Times, p. C1. (3 March 2000).

42. Mark Landler, ‘Asia’s Tycoons Prepare to Join Rush to Internet’, New York Times, p. 1. (29 May 2000).

43. Craig Smith, ‘A Dot-Com Revolution in China’, New York Times, p. B1 (15 July 2000).

44. Lizette Alvarez, ‘High-Tech Industry Long Shy of Politics, Is Now Belle of Ball’, New York Times, p. 1. (26 December 1999).

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

48. James Fallows, ‘Billion-Dollar Babies’, New York Review, p. 9. (16 December 1999).

49. Feliciano Garcia, ‘The Lists’, Fortune, p. 294. (17April 2000).

50. Ibid.

51. Patrick Barta, ‘The Churning of the Workforce’, Chicago Tribune, Section 6, p. 1. (26 March 2000).

52. Jerry Harris, ‘Globalization and the Technological Revolution of Capitalism’, Cy.Rev #5, p. 19. (Fall-Winter 1997).

53. Chris Meyer, ‘The 10 Driving Principles of the New Economy, Rule #1, What’s the Matter’, Business 2.0, p. 193. (March 2000).

54. Parn Woodall, ‘The World Economy’, Economist. (28 September 1996).

55. Keith Bradsher, ‘Gentlemen Merge Your Manufacturers’, New York Times, p. C1. (23 March 2000).

56. Michael Schuman, ‘Asian Factories Fire Up Foreign Investors’, Wall Street Journal. (8 March 2000).

57. Mark Landler, ‘Asia’s Tycoons Prepare to Join Rush to Internet’, New York Times, p. 1. (29 May 2000).

58. Bill Barnhart, ‘Traders Thrive on Volatility, but Some Say Enough’, Chicago Tribune, Section 3, p. 1. (14 April 2000).

59. Ibid.

60. Jerry Harris, ‘Globalization and the Technological Transformation of Capitalism’, Cy.Rev #5, p. 17. (Fall-Winter 1997).

61. Craig Karnin, ‘The Global Shareholder’, Wall Street Journal, p. R4. (9 May 2000).

62. Edmund Andrews, ‘Streamlining a German Blimp’, New York Times, p. C1. (29 February 2000).

63. Saskia Sassen, ‘Global Financial Centers’, Foreign Affairs, p. 83. (January/February 1999).

64. Christan Weller, ‘Global Banking’, Foreign Policy in Focus, Vol. 3, #9, p. 1. (May 1998).

65. Peter Sinton, ‘Still Banking on the Net’, San Francisco Chronicle, page C1, (August 10, 2000)

66. Jean Yaremchuk, ‘All the World’s A Venture Capital’, www.news.com, 8-17-00

67. Michel Beaud, A History of Capitalism 1500-1980. New York, (Monthly Review Press, 1983). P. 86

68. Wired, ‘High-Fiber Diet’, p. 142. (June 2000