The
Election That Nobody Won: American Politics & the Crisis of
Strategy (page
1 of 2)
By Carl Davidson
Cy.Rev Managing Editor
The stalemated
2000 U.S. presidential election has cast a public spotlight
on all the strategic and tactical weaknesses of all the political
forces concerned.
It was truly
an election that nobody won. To be sure, George W. Bush is now
the legal president; but because of his strategic failures and
the strategic failures of all the other prime players, the Bush
presidency will lack legitimacy for the period ahead.
Strategy
is one of the most crucial matters in politics. Success or failure
here is a measure of one’s ability, first, to take an
accurate measure of the overall circumstances and, second, to
make an accurate and fruitful determination of adversaries and
allies in each successive set of circumstances. As Alvin Toffler
recently put it, any political player who doesn’t have
a strategy is really a pawn in someone else’s strategy.
So how did
our political players in this election measure up on their strategies?
Here’s a quick review of the main points:
The
Gore Campaign. The neoliberal Democratic Leadership
Council was the inner core of Vice President Al Gore’s
campaign. Its strategy has been, for several years, to distance
itself and the Clinton-Gore team from the party’s traditional
progressives, with the aim of uniting the country's political
center and winning over elements of the right.
By trying
to marginalize the left Democrats, however, the DLC ignored
the crucial role of what can be called the critical force in
building broad coalitions. Critical forces are insurgent constituencies
that not only raise their own issues, but also pose broader
questions against a main adversary that can help mobilize the
more passive and static constituencies aligned with them. The
Democrat’s left progressives, especially among African
Americans, have played this militant minority role in winning
earlier mass campaigns.
This race
was different. This conscious push to the center, explained
the Aug. 15 Christian Science Monitor, seen in Gore's choice
of Joseph Lieberman as his running mate, has distracted (if
not alienated) many activist Democrats. Senator Lieberman is
chairman of the Democratic Leadership Council, a pro-business
group (of which Clinton also is a leading figure) that has nudged
the party rightward in recent years.
One example
of this trend on the party's left wing: The congressional Progressive
Caucus, a 53-member group of Democrats, got slapped down at
the recent drafting of the party's platform.3:23 AM Among the
group’s defeated proposals were those that would have
limited the president's ability to negotiate trade agreements,
raised pay and benefits for low?wage workers, and expanded government?funded
healthcare.
They talk
about a big tent, grumbled Rep. Dennis Kucinich (D) of Ohio,
a member of the Progressive Caucus. But this tent just got a
bit smaller.
After spending
years criticizing and dismissing the traditional progressive
constituencies, Blacks, labor, feminists, greens, the DLC at
the last moment expected these same activists to turn on a dime
and mobilize the full strength of all those who supposedly had
nowhere else to go. Some progressives responded to the call,
but many others either stayed home or campaigned for Nader.
One indicator: the overall voter turnout this year was about
50 percent, compared to 55 percent in 1992 when Clinton ran
against Bush the elder.
“I
don’t like that the DLC gets it all”, said Robert
Kuttner of the American Prospect, summing up the new relation
of forces in the Democratic Party, “and Gore ends up being
the left wing of the ticket.”
The DLC’s
policy of “distancing” its candidate from African-Americans
continued even into the month-long battle over the Florida recounts
and the court decisions that finally decided the election. While
one exposure after another revealed GOP efforts to undercount,
miscount and otherwise disenfranchise voters in Black precincts,
the Gore campaign downplayed these issues and stuck to narrower
technical challenges to the vote counting process. At the unprecedented
protest by the Black Congressional Caucus at the time of the
Congressional approval of the Electoral College vote, not one
Democratic Senator could be found to join their ranks.
The
Bush campaign. The GOP’s strategy was an attempt
to unite the right and far right, win over the center, and defeat
the progressives. The critical force for Bush was the militant
insurgency around the right-wing Christian Coalition. Its only
clear-cut success, however, was isolating and defeating Pat
Buchanan and his wing of the Reform Party on the far right.
Bush did
make some inroads in winning over the center. What was new was
his campaign’s “new diversity” and “compassionate
conservatism” repackaging. It made some notable gains
among moderate Hispanics and Asians, while expanding the GOP’s
“Reagan Democrat” blue-collar white males. In fact,
Bush carried a clear majority of white males with less than
a college education. (One third of all union members also voted
for Bush, a point that should be pondered by AFL-CIO officials
blaming Nader for their failures.)
But Bush’s
strategy stumbled badly over his overall assessment of the center
forces and the “Gender Gap.” The American center,
in its majority, simply does not want to jail women for having
abortions or to abandon the children in its public schools.
In California, for instance, women voted for Gore over Bush
by an eighteen percent margin. Sociologist Francis Fukiyama
explained it in the November 15 Wall Street Journal:
“It
is not just that women vote in greater numbers than they did,
but that they constitute the key vote that has swung toward
the Democrats in contemporary elections. Foreign policy, strong
national defense and tax cuts were key parts of the traditional
Republican formula that brought Ronald Reagan to power. But
these issues are also pre-eminently male ones, and have consistently
failed to gain much traction among women. Mr. Clinton woke
up to the feminization of American politics and the cultural
issues this spawned much sooner than the Republicans, and
rode it to two election victories.... How politicians play
this issue is very complex, because women are not a homogeneous
voting block and have very different interests on a variety
of issues. But on the whole, this shift spells trouble for
conservatives more than for liberals. The single most important
social change to have taken place in the United States over
the past 40 years concerns sex and the social role of women,
and it is from this single source that virtually all of the
‘culture wars’ stem.”
The
Nader campaign. Ralph Nader, running on the Green
Party line, defined victory differently than his opponents:
getting five percent of the vote nationally to insure ballot
status and federal funds for future elections. To win this
goal, Nader tried to implement a “citizens vs. corporations”
strategy that was essentially a hard-hitting, oppositionist
critique of capitalism, but without a clear alternative
program for restructuring both power and the production
of wealth. It either ignored, attacked or ran ahead of his
potential allies.
Nader’s
anti-corporate vision, moreover, was distorted by an anti-China,
anti-trade protectionism he shared with the AFL-CIO leadership
and, to a certain extent, with Reform Party candidate Pat
Buchanan. As Bruce Shapiro noted in the November 1 Nation,
“Buchanan’s
attacks on global trade and his opposition to U.S. military
adventures abroad have led some influential voices on the
left to wonder whether this is a bargain they could join.
Some in the Naderite orbit, for instance, now argue privately
that Buchanan will not center his campaign on social issues
in the 2000 election, and that a platform based on his corporation?bashing
might be worthy of support.”
In practice,
Nader and the Greens primarily united insurgent white youth
and a portion of the older generation radicalized by the
youth rebellion of the 1960s. Among 18- to 22-year-old voters,
Nader ran at nearly thirty percent. This group, tied to
the anti-globalist protests in Seattle and elsewhere, are
crucial to future party-building efforts. He also ran slightly
higher among Blacks and other minorities than among whites;
and won the endorsement of Black leaders like Cornel West,
Manning Marable and Adolph Reed. But instead of five percent
of the vote nationwide, Nader got 2,716,231 votes, just
under three percent; still not to be taken lightly.
In essence,
the Greens took a get-rich-quick approach to party building.
They tried prematurely to build an electoral organization
from the top down before gathering sufficient strength and
allies from the bottom up. While the Greens displayed some
impressive mobilizing, they now face the task of consolidating
their gains, but lack the infrastructure to do it systematically.
The
Buchanan campaign. Splitting from the GOP and taking over
Ross Perot’s Reform Party, Buchanan’s campaign
was essentially a semi-fascist attempt at empowering a nationalist
united front of European Americans. Its populist anti-globalism
mainly targeted immigrants of color and the third world,
even as it claimed to defend American workers and jobs.
Thomas Edsall put it this way in a June 22 Washington Post
report on a Teamster’s Union press conference:
“With
Nader by his side, (Teamster President James P.) Hoffa said
that ‘only Ralph Nader and Pat Buchanan have stood
with the American workers on trade.’ He added, however,
that on the broad range of labor issues, union representation,
health and safety laws and a host of other issues, Nader
is on the side on the union movement, while Buchanan is
not.... ‘Ralph Nader and Pat Buchanan must be included
in the electoral process,’ Hoffa said. “Furthermore,
the (Presidential Debate Commission) should hold a debate
dedicated specifically to address[ing] workers' issues and
the issue of globalization.”
But
Pat’s minions failed even to unite the far right.
Buchanan completely underestimated the victory-hungry electoral
pragmatism of Pat Robertson’s Christian Coalition,
which stayed with the GOP and left him in the lurch. When
he tried to compensate this loss with a temporary alliance
with Lenora Fulani and the New Alliance Party, he was further
isolated even in his own base. Despite winning $12 million
in federal campaign funds, he wound up with less than one
percent of the vote.
In addition
to Gore, Bush, Nader and Buchanan, there are a number of
other players in the electoral arena that are important
from the perspective of a strategy for the left:
The
Left Democrats. Referred to variously as the Progressive
Wing, the Rainbow Democrats or the New Deal Liberals, many
in this cluster supported former Senator Bill Bradley, in
the Democratic primaries. Others, such as Rev. Jesse Jackson,
were behind Gore from the beginning, believing he was the
stronger candidate against Bush. Unlike the DLC, the Left
Democrats don’t have a single center. In Congress,
they are represented mainly by the Progressive Caucus and
the Black Caucus, but they are also represented by Jackson’s
Rainbow Coalition, the National Organization for Women and
the AFL-CIO’s Committee on Political Education. There
are also differences among them, with the Black Caucus having
the most progressive overall platform.
These
progressives constantly face a dilemma. On one hand, their
political clout is tied to the perks and privileges they
have won as members of the Democratic Party. On the other
hand, they never have enough clout to displace the “Corporate
Caucus,” the DLC, as the primary force with the wealth
and power in the Democratic Party.
Apart
from the DLC’s attempt to marginalize of organizations
of the Left Democrats, the main argument between the two
factions is over how to win over the “white suburban
center.” According to the Dec. 16, 2000 Washington
Post, “The populist wing argues that white voters
without college degrees hold the balance of power while
the centrist wing contends that ‘wired workers’
who use the Internet, and in many cases own stock, are the
key voting bloc.” One side wants to win these constituents
with economic populism while the other wants to use social
conservatism. Both miss the point that Bush made his greatest
inroads into this group with a message of reform, local
and individual empowerment and entrepreneurism, messages
that by no means have to be conceded to the right.
The
Labor Party. This trade union based organization,
which has corralled the electoral ambitions of a number
of left groups, was not a player in 2000. It is rooted among
trade union organizers and activists to the left of the
AFL-CIO leadership. Its strategy is basically to unite the
working class, through its unions, against any candidates
of the Democrats and Republicans. It has isolated itself
through its go-it-alone ultra left tactic of abstaining
from electoral campaigns until it can win big races at the
top first. It opposes any fusion tactic of supporting local
progressive Democrats and any potential candidate on its
line must first break all ties with the Democrats. Two major
national unions affiliated with the Labor Party, the United
Electrical Workers and California Nurses Association, supported
Nader. Most other unions supported Gore. More
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