Cutting
Edge: Technology, Information Capitalism and Social Revolution
(page 2 of 3)
By Jim Davis, Tom Hirschl & Michael Stack
Capitalists
compete with each other to maximize profits, of which one of the
main ways is by getting the workers to produce more in the same
amount of time, by introducing more powerful and productive technology.
At any given moment some capitalists are producing using the newest
technology, and some are using old technology. When a commodity
goes onto the market, it exchanges not at its individual value,
that is, based on the labor used to produce it, but on the modal
value of all of the same type of commodities from various producers,
its social value. Capitalists who made commodities with the most
advanced technology and the least labor in general will sell their
commodities at the same (or maybe slightly less) price than then
commodities made by the backward producers. Because their costs
are lower, the advanced producers will realize extra surplus value,
while those using backward technology and more labor will realize
less surplus value.
The ratio
of constant capital to variable capital is called the organic
composition of capital. As more constant capital is employed in
production, or less labor is employed, the organic composition
of capital rises. Marx argued that this rising organic composition
will cause the rate of profit to fall over time.
As more technology
is thrown at production, a crisis in profitability emerges, manifesting
itself as overproduction and the lack of purchasing power. A product
unsold is value unrealized. This lays the basis for the periodic
crises in capitalism, punctuated by unemployment, bankruptcies,
and the destruction of capital. Once sufficient capital is destroyed,
the system begins to expand again, and the cycle begins anew.
The capitalist use of new technologies, while raising productivity,
as Guglielmo Carchedi notes, also "necessarily implies crises,
exploitation, poverty, unemployment, the destruction of the natural
environment and more generally all those evils which high tech
is supposed to eradicate."
In the first
section of essays, the authors follow several lines of exploration
into the terrain shaped by the new technologies. The collection
starts with Morris-Suzuki's look at some of the "peculiarities"
of knowledge as a factor in production. The new technologies are
possible because of the accumulation of what is known about Nature.
The continuing development of the technologies requires substantial
training, research, etc. In this sense they can be described as
"knowledge-intensive." The function of "knowledge"
in the economy, though, is a problematic one. Once produced, knowledge
is cheap to replicate; it's not "consumed" or exhausted
after use; and, she notes, it "can only acquire a price when
it is protected by a monopoly." Capitalism thrives in the
new climate only by bending and subsuming knowledge formation
to its needs through aggressive privatization, "harnessing
freely available 'social knowledge' to the profit-making activities
of the large corporation."
The consequences
of the critical act of replacing human beings with machines under
capitalism can only be understood by grasping the idea of the
central role of the human being -- as the sole source of value
-- in production. Caffentzis analyzes the history of this idea,
in the context of 19th century discussions of machines, energy
and work, and brings the argument up-to-date with an analysis
of the "Turing Machine" -- a concept developed by the
brilliant English mathematician Alan Turing in the 1930's. Turing
showed the possibility of constructing a machine capable of carrying
out any computational task that a human being could do (with a
few notable exceptions). Caffentzis points out that the Turing
machine means that any skill, whether physical or mental, can
be replicated mechanically -- "computing, like tailoring
and weaving, is just another aspect of human labor-power that
can be exploited to create surplus value and, if its value is
higher than a rival machine, it can be replaced." The reason
that human beings are the sole source of value is therefore not
to be found in any unique talents of the worker, as any machine
can theoretically provide that; rather, it is to be found in the
profound relationship of power and property, at the intersection
of the worker and capital.
The concept
of the Turing machine raises an immediate question: is electronics,
as the basis of contemporary production, a qualitatively different
technology, not just "more," but "different."
In Capitalism and Automation, Ramin Ramtin argues that the capture
of human skills in "software", capable of being repeatedly
activated by microprocessors, "is a technology which brings
to life the machinery of production, it is thus in itself a radically
new form of objectification of labor." In her essay "Robots
and Capitalism", Morris-Suzuki considers the implications
of the replacement of living labor with "objectified labor"
in the form of software. When robots replace living labor in production,
surplus value, and hence, profits, cannot be created in the old
ways. In her analysis, surplus value can only be created "in
the design of new productive information and the initial bringing
together of information and machinery." So companies are
forced into creating the "perpetual innovation economy."
Such an economy accelerates the commodification of particular
kinds of information or knowledge useful to production.
Martin Kenney,
following on Morris-Suzuki's work, pursues the problem of value
creation in the contemporary work site. Knowledge becomes "the
critical production factor" in the "innovation economy"
where workers are reconceived as sources of "knowledge",
and must work within a tighter discipline to ensure uninterrupted
production. Kenney notes the central role of "intellectual
property" in the "innovation economy", but he suggests
that "protecting" copyrights and patents -- essential
to maintaining the commodity status of knowledge -- in the digital
age is problematic, if not ultimately impossible.
This view
of a "knowledge economy" is not without its problems.
Dan Schiller points out that "knowledge" is essential
to all societies. The location of "social discontinuity"
is not to be found in what he calls "information exceptionalism",
in seeing some special qualities of information or knowledge.
Such a view removes information and knowledge from a long history
of "commoditization", ultimately mystifying it. The
"knowledge society" is not the end of history, but rather,
capitalism, adjusted (and adjusting) to a new technological climate.
Jim Davis
and Michael Stack follow up on Schiller's critique of information
exceptionalism by looking at one critical aspect of the application
of new technologies to the economy. Digitalization -- the
conversion of information and "knowledge" into the
1s and 0s that can be manipulated by digital machines -- is
an important means by which "knowledge" and "information"
is cheaply replicated and quickly socialized. The enormous
economic advantages of digitally rendering products means
that more and more commodities appear in an "information
form", and the economy is undergoing a broad restructuring
to take advantage of the digital rendition. The Internet represents
the re-creation of the transport and communication system
to handle the digital traffic. Various industries, once separated
by incompatible media, find themselves digitally converged
into the same competitive arena. And not least, the digital
transformation is having a profound affect on the role of
human beings in production.
It is
important to remember that these technologies spring from
somewhere. When scientists, engineers and other mental workers
are set to solving problems posed by their employers, the
results are stamped with the demands and needs of the ruling
class. At the same time, though, technology is produced amidst
conflicting social relations, and thus holds the possibility
of being a tool for liberation as well as for social control.
Jonathan King looks at the roots of one particular field,
biotechnology. The history of biotechnology, funded in large
part through public monies, is increasingly appropriated by
private interests. Private appropriation radically constrains
the social benefits of biotechnology, and raises the specter
of "egregious violations of human dignity and body in
the quest for private gain."
A recurring
theme throughout the essays in this book is the impact of
electronics, as well as other new technologies made possible
by electronics (including digital telecommunications, computers
and biotechnology), on the working class. The exchange of
the ability to work (i.e., labor power) for wages, and wages
for necessities, is the foundation of capitalist relations
of production. The idea of the "end of work" has
been raised in several recent books, including Jeremy Rifkin's
The End of Work, and Stanley Aronowitz and William DiFazio's
The Jobless Future. Morris-Suzuki points out that if human
beings are made redundant in production by automation, then
surplus value disappears, and capitalism becomes unsustainable.
"Perpetual innovation" forestalls the problems faced
by Capital.
Ramtin,
in Capitalism and Automation, poses the dilemma for capitalism:
"[F]or
capitalist production 'a certain number of workmen must be
employed in the same field of labor'. Less than a certain
number of productive workers and capitalist production becomes
impossible. The application of microelectronics technology
to production processes will radically reduce that 'minimum'
quantity of living labor-power essential for the self-expansion
of social capital. At a certain stage, the quantitative displacement
of living labor generates a qualitative break in the organization
and structure of capital production." (Ramin Ramtin,
Capitalism and Automation, Pluto Press, 1991. p. 56)
New technologies
mean the end of work; the end of work means the inability
to make profit, the inability to realize value, and the end
of value creation. These describe the conditions for the end
of capitalism.
This of
course raises a few problems. First, is "work",
or value creation, disappearing? Caffentzis dismisses this
notion. Davis and Stack suggest looking beyond the often-cited
employment statistics to other indicators of the trend towards
"the end of value." Davis and Stack suggest that
capital, as a social relation, starts to break down as the
cash nexus of the wage relationship is eroded, and that this
process is most vividly revealed in the social destruction
going on throughout the world.
A second
question is deeper -- is change possible? Can we envision
a society beyond capitalism, where value, "work"
in the traditional sense, exploitation, etc. no longer exist?
Is revolution possible? Mike Brand presents a unique approach
to this question by drawing on recent developments in complexity
theory, establishing a connection between it and dialectics,
and testing the applicability to social change. Thomas Hirschl
revisits Marx's theory of revolution in light of current changes.
"Maturing social polarization in an era of qualitative
technological progress is Marx's formula for revolution."
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