Book
Review:
Karl
Sveiby’s ‘The New Organizational Wealth’
Reviewed by Jerry
Harris
Chicago Third Wave Study Group
Karl Sveiby’s
The New Organizational Wealth joins a small but growing number
of books devoted to understanding the new knowledge economy and
how corporations need to find new ways to measure value. As information
technologies becomes key in the creation of wealth, the task of
understanding the value knowledge produces begins to assume ever
greater importance to economic theory.
A case in point was
a recent Chicago Tribune front page story under the headline,
“The Unlikely Economy.” With unemployment down, consumer
confidence up, and an ongoing expansion, prices have dropped instead
of going up. While most traditional economists were baffled, one
theorist argued that investment in computers and labor-saving
technology had pushed production beyond what the government could
measure using the antiquated tools which only count industrial
output. It’s no longer simply giant physical assets which
form the foundation of value in the economy. The difference between
a corporation’s net book value and its market value also
reflects its intangible assets or “good will,” which
now usually exceeds physical assets. For example, General Motors
with all its plants and equipment is valued at half of Microsoft
with their single “campus” filled with nothing but
desks and computers.
Sveiby divides these
intangible assets into three parts: employee competence; internal
structures such as patents, concepts. and computer systems; and
external structures like customer relationships and public image.
Knowledge corporations whose value is based in these types of
assets do not face diminishing returns because, unlike limits
on physical resources, ideas are infinite.
Sveiby bases knowledge
within the social context of human interaction so that learning
is a continual process which gives people the capacity to act.
Therefore when he talks of worker competence, his definition embraces
factual knowledge, skill, experience, value judgment and social
networks. Knowledge is not something that can simply be programmed
into software and used by anyone. Rather knowledge is deeply embedded
in each individual, reflects their experience, and ability to
communicate and act. Value thus resides in the worker and not
the technology.
The author makes a
sharp distinction between information and knowledge; in fact he
states that “information is meaningless and of low value.”
His advice to managers is to treat information as a “glut
product with little or no economic value.” It’s knowledge
that makes sense of information, and the best way to impart knowledge
is the traditional method of personal transfer. While information
in technological systems contain knowledge, competence comes from
the learning process under the guidance of a teacher, as in the
master/apprentice relationship.
In the second part
of the book the author tackles the question of how to manage intangible
assets. His first observation is the power conflict between organizational
managers and knowledge workers. Knowledge professionals need the
freedom to create and are the workers most responsible for producing
revenue. On the other hand managers police the organization and
tend to value routine. This produces two power centers with resulting
struggles over policy and direction. Sveiby’s advice is
to see and treat professionals as revenue centers, not as labor
costs. They should be given the same or even better pay than their
managers, and have access to the same information. When experts
become senior workers and are past their peak revenue producing
activity they should be used as teachers for younger experts.
For Sveiby support
staff are low in professional and organizational competence, tend
to develop “underdog symptoms,” and make narrow demands
around working conditions, But most anyone who has worked in an
office knows that support staff actually have great organizational
competence, and in fact often know more about the daily operation
than managers. If given the chance, support staff can also have
important insight into professional areas because of knowledge
based in life-long experience.
A Case in Point
One business that might
surprise Sveiby was the Community Law Collective in San Francisco
which included support staff in all firm discussions over policy,
community relations, and business decisions. For sisteen years
this collective was one of the most successful models to develop
out of the critical law movement of the 1 960s. The two Chicana
legal secretaries became full partners of the collective and were
paid equally with the lawyers. Because these women were from the
community in which the law collective worked, they helped to bring
in cases which expanded the client base, and played an important
role in maintaining relations with a wide set of neighborhood
contacts. As collective lawyer Paul Harris explained they increased
the “good will” and reputation of the office. They
also taught the lawyers about the community and how best to relate
to clients. These examples are exactly what Sveiby means by knowledge
value.
The secretaries also
exerted real influence in policy debates. One of the most important
was whether or not to represent drug dealers who were offering
a lot of money for legal services. Some of the lawyers argued
forcefully to take these cases. But the typists opposed this position
because it would harm the reputation and good will the collective
held in the community. The secretaries won the debate and thereby
helped guarantee the long term success of the business.
Like many other corporate
consultants, Sveiby is big on outsourcing, particularly of low-status
jobs such as watchmen, cleaners and gatekeepers. He argues at
outsourced firms these workers become “security executives
and hygiene specialists whose experience and skills are vital
assets. They become aware of a hunger they never felt when employed
by large firms to perfect and develop their skills . This change
in perspective affects strategy in a profound way. When knowledge
of cleaning is the core business, the skill of cleaners become
a strategic core competence.” (p. 103) I think Sveiby needs
to clean a few toilets and carry out his own garbage for a week.
This fantasy of turning low paid and insecure workers into what
the author now calls “independent professionals” is
the worst type of corporate hype. One of the areas of greatest
ignorance for knowledge consultants is their lack of understanding
of working class reality One must wonder if this isn’t all
just corporate propaganda to cover low-wage profit strategies,
or simply an area where the author lacks “competence.”
Sveiby is on firmer
ground when he returns to the relationship of information to knowledge,
and the role they can play in a company. He estimates that the
supply of information has grown tenfold over the last ten years
which has caused an excess of supply over demand. As Sveiby explains,
“it takes time, experience, and mental effort to turn information
into useful knowledge. Information that turns out to be worthless
is really worth less than nothing.” (p. 111) Financial markets
are the most information intensive where speed plays a key role.
Yet adding more information obscures and slow things down and
therefore can play a negative role.
Mass vs. Custom
Many corporations have
reacted to the informatization of markets in a typical second
wave fashion. The more information the better, as if mass market
strategies can be adapted to the knowledge economy. This leads
to a strategy of offering a low degree of customization, aiming
at mass sales, and regarding people as costs. Managers usually
promote this industrial age strategy, particularly because it
increases control and lowers costs by substituting information
technology for labor. This widespread use of information technology
inside an industrial pattern may explain the lack of big gains
in productivity because managers can not visualize the proper
use of the new productive tools.
As Sveiby explains:
“Information technology can be used to standardize or to
customize. It can be used to increase control over people or to
decrease it. It can be use to control very large bureaucracies
or empower very large networks. It can be a powerful servant of
an industrial strategy, an information-focused strategy, or a
powerful enabler of knowledge-focused strategy. The choice is
made not by the technology but by those in power.” (p. 137)
Knowledge based strategy develops a high degree of customization,
which sells knowledge as a relationship and process. It looks
to the “potential of professionals to increase revenue rather
than on the ability of managers to reduce costs. (p. 138) The
strategy is hard to copy because it is based in specialized knowledge
and therefore very competitive.
And as Sveiby shows in the last part of his book this strategy
is quantifiable, predictable, and controllable.
The three major indicators
used to measure intangible assets are growth and renewal, efficiency,
and stability. Each of these is analyzed in terms of the companies’
external and internal structures, and the competency of its workers.
The areas used to measure the growth of worker competency are
the average number of years that professionals have in their field,
education levels, and how many customers demand the development
of new knowledge skills. Under efficiency the value added per
expert and the value added per employee is measured. Stability
means tracing expert turnover and seniority years—particularly
compared to new hired experts. In all these areas Sveiby is looking
for ratios and sets of balances that are correlated with good
profits rates.
Only professional staff
are grouped under competency. Support staff are measured as part
of the internal structure along with investments in R&D and
information technology as percents of value added activity. External
structure looks at the time employees spend building, and developing
customer relations. And customers are measured not only by profitability,
but image enhancement, references, and if the relationship spurs
the company to learn new skills.
These and other measurements
are used to monitor each area of intangible assets and direct
the company on investment and organizational decisions. Sveiby
is not just spinning abstract theories. His ideas have been put
to successful use in a number of corporations. Two Swedish firms,
WM-data and Skandia AFS are leaders in this field. For those of
you tired of reading futurists predicting how technology will
change our world, here is a book hard at work developing the economic
theory that can measure the real changes taking place.
Lastly, one insight
that struck me while reading this book is how much political groups
are knowledge organizations. Many of Sveiby’s ideas are
directly applicable to political parties. Your best organizers
or cadre are your knowledge professionals, always demanding the
freedom to create and adopt tactics while the administrative apparatus
is often concerned with routine and control. The “good will”
a political party maintains with its base is key to its success.
There needs to be a good ratio between senior organizers and new
blood, with older cadre acting as teachers. New mass campaigns
extend the knowledge base of the group and forces itto learn new
skills. and the list goes on. So reading Sveiby is valuable from
a number angles. The book runs 202 pages including graphs, well
designed charts and chapter summaries.