The 2004 Elections: War, Terrorism and the Need for Regime Change
By Carl Davidson

The “white blindspot” is deeply embedded in the defense of empire. In any case, if terrorism of whatever sort is a tactic and a method of rule, it makes no sense to declare war on it, for the simple reason that there is no end to it. One can declare war on a state or an organized movement—such a struggle has a beginning and an end, victors and vanquished. But tactics and methods can be passed on, time and again, as long as there are those who find a need for them. Moreover, terrorism can be highly political and its meaning can shift with changing political events and perspectives. For many years, governments in the West called Nelson Mandela and the ANC terrorists; now they are statesmen and national liberators.

But what about the terrorism of 9/11? This is the main form of terrorism that is front and center in the consciousness of the American people and the people of many other countries terrorized by al-Quaeda today. First, it is the method of a semi-feudal oil-rich oligarchy and the center of a reactionary movement to restore and expand a theocratic dictatorship. This is the essence of al-Quaeda’s drive to destroy “Jews and Crusaders,” “restore the Caliphate” and impose its Wahabi version of Islamic law over all lands ever dominated by Islam throughout history. Its “anti-imperialist” rhetoric is no more genuine than the “anti-British imperialism” invoked by the German fascists in another time.

Broad Cooperation & Collective Security

In truth, the events of 9/11 are best described as crimes against humanity, and not as acts of war. Why is the distinction important? The conservative right flies into a fury when it’s made; to them it’s war and nothing less. But Nelson Mandela, Fidel Castro, many other leaders in the UN, and progressive voices worldwide stressed the first approach. It saw the battle with bin Laden as mainly a political and economic struggle, requiring broad coalitions of countries working together on collective security and intelligence, which would require armed force to arrest and disorganize the culprits only at the end of the process, by which they would be brought to justice.

Bush’s unilateralist, militaristic approach, on the other hand, granted the other side a political victory from day one. He conceded to bin Laden and his ilk the desire to see this conflict as a war, albeit a “holy war.” Moreover, it allowed the US to be portrayed as opposed to Islam in general, and not just to al-Quaeda. Again, the UK’s Michael Howard, drawing lessons from British counter-insurgency efforts, makes the point:

“But we never called them 'wars': we called them 'emergencies'. This meant that the police and intelligence services were provided with exceptional powers, and were reinforced where necessary by the armed forces, but all continued to operate within a peacetime framework of civil authority. If force had to be used, it was at a minimal level and so far as possible did not interrupt the normal tenor of civil life. The object was to isolate the terrorists from the rest of the community, and to cut them off from external sources of supply. They were not dignified with the status of belligerents: they were criminals, to be regarded as such by the general public and treated as such by the authorities. To 'declare war' on terrorists, or even more illiterately, on 'terrorism' is at once to accord them a status and dignity that they seek and which they do not deserve. It confers on them a kind of legitimacy.” More >>