Book
Review:
The Amoral Elephant
By WILLIAM TABB
(New York, Monthly Review Press) 244 pp. $18.00.
Reviewed by Jerry Harris
William Tabb’s
book is an engaging and intelligent discussion of globalization
and its effects on capitalism. His articles often appear in Monthly
Review and are a significant step beyond ex-editor Ellen Meiksins
Wood’s position that the new economy was just so much “globaloney.”
Tabb’s book is a serious and readable study that not only
accurately describes globalization but also points our attention
to important new developments. As he states in chapter two, there
is a “movement from national economies to a globalized economic
system based on a new constellation of leading sectors, internationalized
statist institutions, to emergent class structures.” (p. 37)
These points which focus on information technology, the changing
nature of the state and class relations go to the heart of the matter.
Tabb opens his
discussion with the importance of the communications/computer revolution,
historically linking its effect to the earlier capitalist epoch
in which railroads helped build a new economy dominated by national
monopolies. This analysis, which shows that a shift in the means
of production has lead to “remaking the global political economy,”
(p. 43) is a key point often downplayed or missed in studies that
start from cultural or sociological viewpoints. Tabb on the otherhand,
is grounded in political economy and so begins with a historical
materialist approach firmly rooted in the Marxist tradition.
In chapter three
Tabb examines the role and power of the nation state, perhaps the
most hotly debated question in global studies. He points out that
Keynesian policies were part of a national strategy eroded by international
capital markets. But Tabb doesn’t conclude that the state
is fading away, rather its being redefined by the “dominant
forces in policy making…the most internationalized sectors
of transnational corporations and financial institutions.”
(p. 61) Tabb correctly sees the growing role of the IMF, World Bank
and WTO as an “emergent international state apparatuses”
(p. 69) under the domination of finance capital. Although he doesn’t
conclude that there is an emerging transnational capitalist class
he does note the rise of important elements in this developing historic
bloc, including globalizing corporate and financial leaders, Third
World elites, and the professional and technical strata tied to
transnational capital.
Overall Tabb’s
discussion of the Asian meltdown in chapter five is an excellent
unraveling of a complicated story. But he sees the main cause of
the crisis as U.S. driven free market policies undermining Asian
growth models through the use of the IMF under the direction of
the U.S. Treasury Department. There is some validity to this view,
but I don’t think it is the whole, or even the main picture
of events. Transnational capital has been involved in a complex
attempt to build a new model of global accumulation. Not just U.S.
finance but all transnational sectors from Japan, Europe, to local
Asian capital have been fully engaged. While the U.S. Treasury has
played an important role in no way has this been solely a project
of U.S. hegemony. Asia became a particular focus point because of
its rapid growth. But in Thailand where the crisis started the U.S.
ranked as only the fifth largest international investor, tied with
the Netherlands.
Over the next
two chapters Tabb details the integration of global capital, manufacturing
and trade, and their effects on the living conditions of everyday
citizens. These pages have many excellent examples of the concrete
and widespread changes brought about by globalization. But Tabb
seems caught between old perceptions and new evidence of a changed
world. This causes him to shift between asserting the domination
of U.S. hegemony while presenting data that shows the power and
influence of transnational capital.
For example,
while discussing the devastating effects of unregulated financial
speculation on the Third World Tabb lays blame for this activity
on the “U.S. model, which serves Wall Street speculators.”
(p. 145) As he states, “Europeans, Japanese and Third World
countries that favored some form of international agreement on new
rules of managing international financial markets have been unable
to budge the United States or to successfully oppose its will.”
(p 146) This argument sees the “Wall Street-Treasury-IMF complex”
as a vehicle for U.S. domination. Yet speculative capital has deep
roots among the bourgeoisie of every region in the world. Open capital
markets didn’t develop just to serve U.S. hegemony but to
facilitate a transnational hegemonic bloc that includes globalizing
class sectors the world over. After the Asian crash the debate over
regulation had advocates from every country, one of the strongest
voices being Joseph Stiglitz from the U.S. and the World Bank’s
chief economist.
Tabb’s
dilemma over the nature of transnationalization becomes even clearer
when he examines trade and competition. Explaining why protectionism
is no longer a major policy he points to the “growing interpenetration
of national economies under the dominance of transnational capital
and the hegemonic status of the United States.” (p. 128)
Here we need
to ask Tabb who runs the show, transnational capital or the U.S.?
In fact, Tabb goes on to build evidence that points to a transnationalized
system rather than a system built to serve the U.S. As he explains,
“The leading states are also engaged in a strategic alliance
with major competitors based in other countries and continents and
see their future in terms of a closely integrated globalized system.”
(p. 132) And later he says, “To think in terms of U.S. corporations
versus foreign corporations, of “our” capitalist versus
“their” capitalist, is anachronistic. To think in terms
of a nationalism in which all Americans, owners and workers, should
stand together to protect an “us” against “them”
is foolishness, and should be understood as such by working-class
Americans.” (p.175-76)
Tabb seems caught
in a contradiction. If economic nationalism is meaningless than
what is U.S. hegemony? He attempts to reduce this question of nationalism
to the limited territory of U.S. corporations and the U.S. state,
essentially a ruling class without a nation. Yet he correctly shows
that this state and class are in “strategic alliance with
major competitors.” Tabb’s analysis is stuck between
the past of hegemonic U.S. imperialism and an emerging global system
under the leadership of a transnational class. The contradictory
evidence he uses actually points to a developing dialectic in which
the old nationalism is fading as a new transnationalized system
is being born. His book builds this case yet the author himself
is unable to make the analytical conclusion of his own evidence.
Future work by William Tabb will indeed be interesting and worthwhile
to follow.
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